Readings
Some of the links below will take you directly to the electronic version of the paper or book chapter. In order to access those from an off-campus location, you may need to use your library proxy server. To use the USC Libraries one, simply drag this link to your bookmarks folder (for instructions see here).
Readings for 1/15
- Smith, ‘Humean Rationality’.
- Humberstone, ‘Direction of Fit’.
- Hume, Treatise, II.3.iii. (Optional.)
- Smith, The Moral Problem, ch. 4. (Optional.)
Readings for 1/22
- Smith, ‘Humean Rationality’.
- Lewis, ‘Desire as Belief’.
- Lewis, ‘Desire as Belief II’. (Optional.)
Readings for 2/19
- Lewis, ‘Desire as Belief II’.
- Weintraub, ‘Desire as Belief, Lewis notwithstanding’. (Optional.)
- Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapter 6.
Readings for 2/26
- Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapter 8.
- Dougherty, ‘On whether to prefer pain to pass’.
- Street, ‘In defense of Future Tuesday Indifference’. (Optional.)
Readings for 3/5
- Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, chapter 1.
- Stampe, ‘The Authority of Desire’. (Optional.)
Readings for 3/7
- Parfit, On What Matters, chapters 1 and 2.
Readings for 3/12
- Parfit, On What Matters, chapter 5.
- Dietrich and List, ‘A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice’.
Readings for 3/26
- Railton, ‘Toward a Unified Account of Rationality in Belief, Desire, and Action’. (Until the end of the section titled ‘Modeling desire’.)
Readings for 4/2
Readings for 4/9
- Jeffrey, ‘Preference among Preferences’.
- Dietrich and List, ‘A model of non-informational preference change’.
Readings for 4/16
- Gibbard, Wise Choices, chapters 8 and 9. (You can skip the postscript to chapter 9 on secondary qualities.)
- Gibbard, Wise Choices, chapters 3 and 4. (Optional background reading.)
Readings for 4/18
- Gibbard, Wise Choices, chapters 10 and 11.
- Gibbard, Wise Choices, chapters 12 and 13. (Optional.)
Readings for 4/23
- Greenspan, ‘Practical reasoning and Emotion’.
Readings for 4/30
- Dorr, ‘Non-cognitivism and wishful thinking’.
- Budolfson, ‘Non-cognitivism and rational inference’.