Phil 428

Anglo-American Philosophy since 1950

Next week

Next week we will finish our discussion about the Private Language Argument. After that, we will move on to talk about Hare’s The Language of Morals. I will specify the relevant sections in the next day or two. In the meantime, I wanted to give you some suggestions for how to prepare for our next meeting.

Remember that we were considering two different candidates for the conclusion of the Private Language Argument. Wittgenstein is arguing against the possibility of a language in which “The individual words are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations” (§243). But this can be interpreted in one of two ways:

  1. Words (or expressions) cannot refer to these ‘private sensations’.
  2. No word can be such that its meaning is exhausted by the ‘private sensations’ it refers to.

Please think about the following two questions. Your answers to these will form the basis for our discussion next Monday.

  • Can we argue from (1) to the conclusion that there are no private sensations?
  • What reasons does Wittgenstein provide for thinking that (2) is true? Do they also support the claim that (1) is true?

In thinking about these questions, you should grant Wittgenstein the following claim.1

For a word to have meaning, there must be publicly available standards to determine when utterances of sentences involving are correct.

Do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. And remember that I hold office hours on Mondays from 1-3.


  1. See the section titled ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Following a Rule’ in Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2 for discussion of this thesis in the context of the discussion of the rule-following considerations.